

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 14, 2003

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** W. White, Pantex Site Representative  
**SUBJECT:** Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending November 14, 2003

**DNFSB Activity Summary:** W. White was on leave Monday. The Pantex Site Office was closed on Tuesday for Veterans' Day. W. White was on site for the remainder of the week.

**Implementation of Technical Safety Requirements:** BWXT completed its contractor readiness assessment this week for the first group of new or revised controls to be implemented from the *Technical Safety Requirements Integrated Implementation Plan*. The need for these controls was identified in the various documented safety analyses completed as part of the implementation of 10 CFR 830. The implementation of a subset of the controls is a deliverable to the Board in the DOE Implementation Plan for Recommendation 98-2.

The assessment noted pre-started findings for 8 of the 13 controls being assessed for implementation. Many of these findings related to problems with the accuracy of the applicability matrix in the Technical Safety Requirements for the controls being implemented. The majority of the other pre-start findings related to inadequate flow down of the controls into site procedures and training. [II, W3, W4]

**Move Right System:** On Friday, BWXT personnel initiated the movement of a nuclear explosive during the time window set aside for explosive-only moves. This is another violation of the administrative program to control the movement of nuclear explosives. In this case the Move Right System authorized the movement, and BWXT personnel moved the unit.

The Move Right System authorized the move because a flag associated with the item being moved did not identify it as a nuclear explosive. Personnel who validated this particular flag did so by using a matrix in the transportation safety analysis that identified nuclear explosive configurations authorized for transportation. Personnel verified that each configuration in the safety analysis matrix was also identified in the database used by the Move Right System as a nuclear explosive. However, they do not appear to have understood that certain configurations in the safety analysis also covered lower-level configurations not specifically called out by part number in the safety analysis. In at least this case, the flag for the lower-level configuration was set incorrectly.

Also of concern, personnel initiating and conducting the move should have been aware that the explosive move window was open, but they were not. The error was identified by alert operations center personnel who were validating that all high explosive moves were completed prior to closing the explosive move window. All moves authorized through the Move Right System have been suspended until BWXT personnel verify the nuclear explosive flag is set correctly for every item in the Move Right System database that contains both plutonium and explosives. [II, W4]

**SNMCRF Independent Project Review:** An independent project review was performed this week for the project to modify an existing, non-nuclear facility for use as the Special Nuclear Material Component Requalification Facility, a category 2 nuclear facility. The project review was performed on behalf of NA-12 to verify the readiness of the project to proceed to construction. The review team found that the project was ready to proceed with construction on facility modifications necessary to convert the building. However, the review team also noted that "the present state of development of the process equipment does not warrant approval to proceed with procurement and fabrication." Until more complete specifications are available for the process equipment, the review team recommended that NNSA withhold authorization to proceed with procurement and fabrication of workstations to be used in the facility. [III, W2]